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Paul Fronstin 
Employee Benefit Research Institute
Employee benefits that are voluntarily provided by employers have 
become a major source of income for workers in the United States. In 
1960, employee benefits accounted for 8 percent of total compensa 
tion, with pensions and health insurance accounting for 3.4 percent. 
By 1993, employee benefits accounted for 18 percent of total compen 
sation, or $673.6 billion, with pensions and health insurance account 
ing for 10.3 percent (Employee Benefit Research Institute 1995). 
Among firms most likely to offer employee benefits, the percentage is 
even higher. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce (1995) found that the 
average payment for pension plans and health insurance was 17.6 per 
cent of payroll in 1994.
Pension plans are one of the most popular employee benefits pro 
vided by employers. According to Table 1, 60 percent of all wage and 
salary workers in 1993 were employed by an employer that sponsored a 
pension plan. While 79 percent of wage and salary workers participated 
in the pension plan when their employer sponsored a plan, only 47 per 
cent of all wage and salary workers participated in a pension plan 
because some employers did not offer a pension plan, some workers did 
not qualify to participate in a pension plan, and some workers voluntar 
ily choose not to participate. Of those participating in a pension plan, 
54 percent were included in a defined-benefit plan, while 62 percent 
were included in a defined-contribution plan. Almost 25 percent partic 
ipated in both defined-benefit and defined-contribution plans.
Employer sponsorship and employee participation in a pension 
plan varies across demographic variables and job characteristics. Table 
1 indicates that older workers are more likely to work for an employer
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that sponsors a pension plan, more likely to participate in that pension 
plan, and more likely to have a defined-benefit plan than younger 
workers. Not surprisingly, differences in sponsorship and participation 
also occur across family type, race, education, gender, unionization, 
occupation, firm size, industry, and hours of work.
Health insurance is another employee benefit that many employers 
offer to workers. According to Table 2, 74 percent of wage and salary 
workers were employed by an employer that sponsored a health insur 
ance plan in 1993, and 58 percent of all workers participated in a health 
insurance plan. Of the 79 percent that participated in their employer's 
health insurance plan, 40 percent have coverage only for themselves, 
while 60 percent also have coverage for a family member. 1 Table 2 
also shows the probability of participating in a health insurance plan 
and the type of plan for various demographic variables and work- 
related attributes.
Theoretically, workers demand employee benefits from their 
employer for numerous reasons. First, preferential tax treatment of 
employee benefits reduces the price of the benefits to both employers 
and employees and is thus expected to increase the demand for 
employee benefits. However, the evidence regarding the effect of pref 
erential tax treatment on employee benefits is mixed. Using cross-sec 
tional data, Alpert (1983), Clain and Leppel (1989), and Woodbury and 
Bettinger (1991) found positive effects of preferential tax treatment on 
the demand for employee benefits. However, Turner (1987) found that 
employees do not demand a greater number of tax-preferred employee 
benefits when taxes increase. In addition, Vroman and Anderson 
(1984) and Alpert (1987) did not find significant positive tax effects on 
employee benefit growth when using time-series analysis. Second, 
group purchasing results in lower prices for health insurance than an 
individual would obtain in the marketplace. Third, the existence of 
economies of scale in the provision of employee benefits makes it more 
efficient (less costly) to provide savings vehicles for retirement and 
health insurance through the workplace (Mitchell and Andrews 1981).
Employers have sound reasons for providing employee benefits. 
Many workers have strong preferences for employee benefits. As a 
result, competition in the labor market will force firms to provide 
employee benefits. Firms that do not offer the wage/benefit packages 
that workers desire can experience higher turnover rates as well as dif-
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ficulties recruiting workers. Virtually all studies on labor mobility con 
clude that pension plans significantly reduce turnover rates (B artel and 
Borjas 1977; Gustman 1990; Ippolito 1986; McCormick and Hughes 
1984; Mitchell 1982; Mitchell 1983). 2 Employers also have an eco 
nomic incentive to offer pension plans to reduce their hiring and train 
ing costs. If an employer's objective is to increase job tenure among 
workers, employers have an added incentive to increase their invest 
ment in training, which will increase the overall productivity of their 
work force. In addition, health insurance plans may improve the health 
and productivity of workers, potentially lowering the firm's rate of 
absenteeism. Along the same lines, the provision of child care facili 
ties can also reduce the incidence of absenteeism. 3
While previous research has contributed to our understanding of 
employee benefits, many studies have not fully utilized theoretical or 
econometric techniques in developing a framework for studying 
employee benefits and their role in the labor market. In addition, data 
problems have led some authors to make conclusions that conflict with 
economic theory. For example, Smith and Ehrenberg (1983) attempted 
to estimate the trade-off between wages and employee benefits but 
failed to find a trade-off because of data problems. In fact, most stud 
ies using micro-level data find a positive relationship between wages 
and employee benefits, mostly because they do not have adequate data 
and can not control for all of the variables that affect employee bene 
fits. However, studies using more aggregated data have found a trade 
off (Woodbury 1983; Woodbury and Huang 1991).
One reason for the various shortcomings in the employee benefits 
literature may be model misspecification. Traditionally, in the simple 
static model of labor supply, labor-force participation decisions are 
assumed to be a function of hourly wages, nonwage income, and per 
sonal characteristics. However, what ultimately matters to workers is 
the total compensation they receive per unit of time worked, along with 
the quality of basic working conditions. In this paper, the simple static 
model of labor supply is extended to include the demand for employee 
benefits. Unlike previous work, which has focused on specific aspects 
of employee benefits, the model presented in this paper is flexible 
enough to take into account all types of employee benefits. A unique 
feature of the model is that labor supply is estimated jointly with the
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demand for employee benefits, using Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
Equations with a correction for selectivity bias.
The chapter is organized into sections that develop the theoretical 
model, present the empirical model, describe the data set and the con 
struction of the variables, discuss the empirical results, and provide a 
summary.
THEORETICAL MODEL
We assume that an individual receives earned income, Y, for time 
worked, and has unearned income, Yn . Earned income and unearned 
income are used to purchase market goods and services, G, such that:
Y + Yn =pg G, (1)
where pg represents the market price of goods and services.
Earned income is equal to the individuals potential hourly wage 
rate4 (pw) (net of taxes) multiplied by the number of hours worked (H) 
minus the employer's and employee's contribution to employee bene 
fits:
Y = pwH-pzB, (2)
where Y equals wH(l - f), pw is equal to w(l - f) + B/H, t represents the 
marginal tax rate, pz represents the shadow price of employee benefits, 5 
and B represents the quantity of employee benefits consumed by the em 
ployee. In Eq. 2, Y represents after-tax, take-home income that the 
worker can freely spend to purchase market goods and services and/or 
employee benefits. Employee contributions to employee benefits are 
subtracted from potential take-home income because these contributions 
come out of the workers potential take-home wage in order to take 
advantage of lower prices via economies of scale, group purchase, and 
the preferential tax treatment.
Firms hire additional workers until the workers marginal revenue 
product is equal to the workers total compensation rate, where total 
compensation is equal to the sum of wages and the monetary value of
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employee benefits. We assume that employers are indifferent to the 
composition of total compensation, but adjustments are not costless. 
As a result, workers face a trade-off between wages and employee ben 
efits (assuming total compensation is constant across workers with 
equal human capital).
Substituting Eq. 2 into Eq. 1 gives us:
PwH-pzB+Yn =pgG. (3)
Individuals are also subject to a time constraint:
T = L + H, (4)
where T represents total available time and L represents leisure time.6 
Solving Eq. 4 for H, and substituting into Eq. 3 yields the following 
full-income budget constraint:
PwT+Yn = pw L + pz B + pg G. (5)
From Eq. 5, an individual can consume leisure time (L), employee ben 
efits (#), and other market goods and services (G).
Dual to an individual's utility maximization objective is an objec 
tive to minimize expenditures on consumption of goods and services. 
Formally, the individual's dual problem is to choose L, B, and G so as 
to minimize total expenditures (£).
, (6) 
subject to the constraint on utility (f/0) that
UQ = U(L,B,G). (7)
The optimal amounts of L, B, and G chosen will depend on the respec 
tive prices and required utility. Consumer behavior is summarized by 
the expenditure function, which shows the minimal expenditures nec 
essary to achieve a given level of utility for a particular set of prices. 
The consumers equilibrium condition is given by
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E(pg ,pw,pz ;U) = pw T + Yn (8)
where pwT + Yn represents full income. It is assumed that the expendi 
ture function is linearly homogeneous and concave in prices.
ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION
Ever since Stone's (1954) system of demand equations, which 
were derived explicitly from economic theory, alternative specifica 
tions and functional forms of the consumers utility function have been 
proposed, the most popular being the linear model (Stone 1954), the 
Rotterdam model7 (Theil 1965), and the translog model (Berndt and 
Christensen 1972). To avoid placing prior restrictions on the individu 
als utility function, a flexible approximation to the consumers' expen 
diture function is utilized in this study. The resulting expenditure 
function yields an easily estimatable system of consumer demand 
equations from which price and income elasticities can be derived. 
The consumer expenditure function is represented as follows:
logE(p,u) = a(p) + ub(p), (9)
where u lies between 0 (subsistence) and 1 (bliss) and p represents a 
vector of prices. The expenditure function is linearly homogeneous, 
concave in factor prices, and a(p) and b(p) can be regarded as the costs 
of subsistence and bliss, respectively. In order to let the consumer 
expenditure function be flexible, a(p) and b(p) are set as follows:
(11)
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) pointed out that the choice of func 
tional form for the above functions is partly due to the need for a flexi 
ble functional form; however, their main justification is that the 
resulting system of demand equations has desirable properties. In fact,
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substitution of Eqs. 10 and 11 into Eq. 9 yields an expenditure function 
that is flexible and easily estimatable. The resulting system of demand 
equations is known as the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS). The 
AIDS system gives an estimate of the direct or indirect utility function 
yielding estimates of the structure of the workers' preferences for lei 
sure, labor supply, employee benefits, and market goods and services. 
Own-price, cross-price, and income elasticities are easily derived from 
the AIDS model.
The expenditure function used in this study is shown as follows:
(12)
where the subscript /, j equal g, w, and z.
The expenditure function can be logarithmically differentiated, 
yielding the expenditure shares associated with leisure, employee ben 
efits, and market goods and services,
Sw =aw + ZjbWJ (\og Pj ) + bw (logm/p*) (13a)
( 13b>
(13C)
where bl} =Yi(.ci} +C/J' anc* ^e subscript 7 = w, z, and g. The share 
of total compensation spent on each good is a function of the natural 
log of prices and an income term, log(m//?*), where p* represents a 
price index. 8
Economic theory requires the demand system to exhibit three 
properties: adding-up, homogeneity, and symmetry. Adding-up 
implies that the sum of the share equations equal one. We impose this 
condition by restricting the parameters in our system of equations as 
follows:
I, at = 1,1, blw = 0,L, biz = 0,2, blg = 0,X, bt = 0. (14)
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In order for the demand system to be homogeneous of degree zero in 
prices and income, the following within-equation restrictions are 
imposed:
!A,= 0,1,^=0,1,^=0. (15)
Additionally, symmetry is imposed by setting the cross-substitution 
effects equal, such that btj = bjr
After imposing the adding-up, homogeneity, and symmetry condi 
tions, and appending a vector of demographic variables and normally 





Our data allow us to estimate the system only for workers with 
employee benefits and, thus, needs to be adjusted for selectivity bias. 
The method to correct for selectivity bias when the subsample is 
selected based on two choices can be found in Maddala (1983, p. 368). 9
Suppose labor supply and employee benefits are imperfectly 
observed such that:
S =Sl+^, (Ha)
Sz =S*z+ uz (17b)
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Suppose, further, that there are latent variables:
y*2 =X2 -c 2 +£2
(18a) 
(18b)
such that the individual works if and only if ^ >0 and receives 
employee benefits if y2 > 0 . If the MS and es are joint normally distrib 
uted,
y y^21 ^22.
then the selectivity bias has the form





f — _ v T i,, .*., i, ( ,





({) represents the standard normal density function, 
O represents the cumulative distribution function, and 
F is the bivariate normal distribution function.
The parameters T l5 T2 , and part of S22 can be estimated up to scale 
using a bivariate probit model. The model is estimated with sample 
selection because only workers are assumed to receive employee bene-
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fits. The selectivity equations include a comprehensive set of economic 
and demographic variables likely to influence the decision to work and 
receive employee benefits.
Once the selectivity bias has been taken into account, the expendi 
ture share equations can be written as follows:
Sw = aw + bwg (log pg/pw) + bwz (log pzlpw) + bw (log m/p*) (22a)
ll |ff =1,5 =!)] + £„
Sz = az + bzg (log Pg/pz) + bwz (log pJPl) + bz (log mlp*) (22b)
\H =1,B =!)] + &
bzg (log pjpg) + bwg (log pjpg) + bg (log m/p*) (22c)
where H = 1 if the individual participates in the labor force, B = 1 if the 
individual receives employee benefits, F, are parameters, and £, repre 
sent error terms that have zero means conditional on both the individu 
als decision to work and receive employee benefits.
The system of share equations can be estimated using Zellner's 
two-step (or iterative) Feasible Generalized Least Squares procedure or 
maximum likelihood, which is suitable for constrained, singular sys 
tems. One share equation is deleted from the system of equations to 
avoid singularity, because the share equations sum to 1 . The choice of 
which equation to delete is arbitrary and has no effect on the empirical 
results. Data limitations motivate the deletion of the market goods and 
services equation; however, we capture the market goods share from 
our estimation. Also, the price of market goods and services, pg , is nor 
malized to 1 to further simplify the system.
The estimates of the demand system are used to compute the own- 
price, cross-price, and income elasticities of demand. Confidence inter 
vals are constructed for the elasticities by computing the large- sample 
variance of each elasticity (see Kmenta 1986, p. 486).
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DATA
The data for this study come from the April 1993 Current Popula 
tion Survey (CPS). This survey included an employee-benefits supple 
ment in which detailed questions were asked on employer-provided 
pension plans and health insurance plans. With respect to employer- 
provided pension plans, respondents to the supplemental questions 
were asked if their employer or union sponsored a pension plan for 
anyone in their company and whether they were included in the plan. 
Detailed questions were also asked about the type of plan. From the 
survey, we can determine whether the individual was included in a 
defined-benefit plan or a defined-contribution plan and the type of 
defined-contribution plan (i.e., profit sharing, employee stock owner 
ship plan, 401k plan, salary reduction plan, etc.). An additional set of 
questions was asked about any salary reduction plans (i.e. 401k, 403b, 
etc.), the amount the individual contributed to the plan, and the amount 
of the contribution that the employer matched.
Salary reduction pension plan data is highly suitable to our model 
because it allows individuals to make choices about their level of con 
tributions to the pension plan. Unlike a defined-benefit plan where a 
worker's retirement benefit is determined by an equation, usually based 
on age, years of service, and final pay—an equation that the worker has 
little control over—a defined-contribution plan with a salary reduction 
component allows a worker more flexibility at the margin in determin 
ing their degree of participation in the plan. Workers are allowed to 
determine how much they want to contribute to the plan on a pre-tax 
basis, and many plans allow workers to change their level of contribu 
tions on a regular basis (i.e., once a month) so that workers are not con 
strained to their choice of contribution level for a long period of time. 
This flexibility is highly desirable when trying to model workers' pref 
erences for pension benefits.
While the CPS also includes data on health insurance plans, the 
data are not detailed enough to yield information about the cost of the 
plan. Respondents to the survey were asked about employer sponsor 
ship of a health insurance plan, their participation, and whether the 
plan also covered family members. The survey does not ask whether 
the worker has a choice of health insurance options or the relative cost
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of those options. In this survey, a worker with three options would be 
treated the same as a worker with only one option. In addition, the cost 
of health insurance is not as optimal as pension plan contributions for 
the model presented in this chapter because workers can not typically 
switch health insurance plans on a regular basis, assuming they even 
have a choice of health insurance plans. Open enrollment, where avail 
able, is usually limited to once per year.
The sample used in this paper is limited to the noninstitutionalized 
civilian population between the ages of 18 and 64. Active duty military 
personnel and the self-employed are not included in the sample, result 
ing in a sample of 37,975 working and nonworking males and 42,875 
working and nonworking females. This sample is used to provide esti 
mates of the bivariate probit model, which is used to correct the system 
of demand equations for selectivity bias. The system of demand equa 
tions is corrected for selectivity bias because it is only estimated with 
data on workers participating in a salary reduction pension plan. This 
results in a selected sample of 2,129 males and 1,544 females. Sample 
means and variable definitions are provided in Table 3.
From the CPS, the following variables are needed to estimate the 
system of demand equations:
1) Share of Leisure Time, Sw :
The share of leisure time is measured as the percentage of full- 
income spent on the consumption of leisure. This is computed as
Total available time, T, is assumed to be equal to 5,840 hours, which is 
the total time available in a given year, given time for sleep. Nonwage 
income, Yn , is measured as total personal unearned income.
2) Share of Pension Plan Contributions, Sz : 
The share of pension plan contributions is computed as follows:
The shadow price of pension plan contributions is measured using 
the workers' marginal tax rate, as discussed in the next section. The
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amount of pension plan contributions, B, is calculated as the annual 
employee contribution to the salary reduction pension plan and does 
not include any match provided by the employer.
3) Price of Pension Plan Contributions, Pz :
The worker's marginal tax rate is used as a proxy for the shadow 
price of the pension plan. As mentioned above, this variable has been 
used extensively in previous research. It should be noted, however, 
that the use of the marginal tax rate has two potential shortcomings. 
First, the marginal tax rate is correlated with income. Higher income 
workers are in higher marginal tax rates. While this may present a 
problem in this study because real total compensation is used as an 
explanatory variable, price and income should have independent 
effects on the share equations. Second, the possibility exists that a 
worker will lower their marginal tax rate by increasing their contribu 
tions to their pension plan. However, a worker's ability to contribute to 
a pension plan on a pre-tax basis is limited by constraints set by the 
Internal Revenue Service, which minimizes the severity of this prob 
lem. In 1993, workers could not contribute more than $9,200 to a 401k 
plan and $9,500 to a 403b plan on a pre-tax basis.
Assumptions about an individual's tax-filing status are made from 
the various demographic characteristics provided in the CPS. Each 
individual's tax-filing status is based on their marital status and the 
number of dependent children. It is assumed that all married and sepa 
rated individuals file a joint tax return. Widowed, divorced, and never 
married individuals are assumed to file as heads of household if they 
have dependent children, otherwise they are assumed to file as single 
taxpayers. Standard deductions and personal exemptions from taxable 
income are based on the number of dependents in the family.
The marginal tax rate is computed from both federal and state 
income tax forms. Local taxes, where applicable, and the social secu 
rity payroll tax are not included in the marginal tax rate. Given limita 
tions on geographic region in the CPS, it is impossible to calculate 
local income tax rates. In addition, previous research has shown that 
estimates of the demand for employee benefits are commonly unaf 
fected by the inclusion of the Social Security payroll tax (Woodbury 
and Hamermesh 1992; Woodbury and Bettinger 1991).
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Sg goods and services share
pw price of leisure
pt price of benefits
m/P* real total compensation
AGE age
AGESQ age squared
MARRIED =1 if married
WIDOWED =1 if widowed
DIVORCED =1 if divorced
SEPARATE =1 if separated
SINGLE =1 if never married
OWNKIDS number of own children under age 18
EDUC1 =1 if some school
EDUC2 =1 if high school graduate
EDUC3 = 1 if college graduate
EDUC4 =1 if completed graduate school
WHITE =1 if white, non-Hispanic
BLACK =1 if black, non-Hispanic
HISPANIC =1 if Hispanic
OTHRACE =1 if other race
UNION =1 if union worker
FULLTIME =1 if full-time worker
WHITECOL=1 if white collar
BLUECOL =1 if blue collar
SERVCOL =1 if service collar
FS 1 = 1 if 1-24 employees
FS2 = 1 if 25-49 employees







































































=1 if 100-249 employees
=1 if 250 or more employees
=1 if employer matches contribution
Selectivity term in leisure equation













4) Price of Leisure Time, pw :
The price of leisure time (the after tax hourly wage rate) is mea 
sured using observed data from the CPS. The hourly wage rate was 
calculated based on usual hours of work per week, weeks worked per 
year, and annual earnings. In some cases where weeks worked per 
year was missing, the mean (51.5) was substituted.
5) Real After-Tax Total Compensation, m:
The measure of real total compensation is obtained by summing 
after-tax annual earnings with annual pension plan contributions and 
dividing by the price index, p*.
6) Price Index,/?*:
Using Stone's (1953) price index, some researchers have approxi 
mated/?* as:
log p* = Sw (log Pw) + Sz (log /?z) + Sg (log Pg)
and have found this to be a good approximation of the price index 
(Anderson and Blundell 1983, 1984; Deaton and Muellbauer 1980; 
Kang 1983; and Woodbury and Huang 1991). We follow this approach 
to estimate the price index. When pg is normalized to 1, the last term 
drops out.
7) Demographic Variables that Affect the Share of Leisure and the 
Share of Pension Plan Contributions:
A vector of demographic variables affecting both the share of lei 
sure and the share of pension plan contributions includes controls for
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the following: age, marital status, number of children, race, education, 
union status, occupation, industry, firm size, and geographic region.
Two variables are included to control for age: age (AGE) and age- 
squared (AGESQ). We expect age to have a nonlinear effect on the 
demand for leisure with the oldest workers having a greater demand for 
leisure as they transition out of the labor force. With respect to pension 
plan contributions, we expect age to always have a positive effect. As 
workers age, they will have less time to take advantage of compound 
interest, and they will also realize the need to start saving for retire 
ment. Thus, they will make larger contributions to their pension plans.
A set of dummy variables on marital status (WIDOWED, 
DIVORCED, SEPARATE, SINGLE) are also included in both the lei 
sure demand equation and the employee benefit demand equation 
(MARRIED is the base group). We expect to find differences in pen 
sion plan contributions between males and females and across marital 
status. Unmarried women are expected to be less likely to demand lei 
sure time and more likely to contribute to pension plans than married 
women. Our expectations are based on previous research, which has 
shown that unmarried women are less likely to intend to retire early 
than married women because they have access to fewer resources than 
married women (Holtmann et al. 1994). The marital status of men, 
however, has not been shown to affect their plans to retire early. We 
expect similar results in this study. In addition, we expect the number 
of children (OWNKIDS) to have an effect on both the share of leisure 
and the share of pension plan contributions. Workers with more chil 
dren are more likely to demand leisure time than workers without chil 
dren in order to spend more time with their children. With respect to 
pension plan contributions, workers with children are expected to con 
tribute less to their pension plan because of the additional expenses 
needed to raise children, all else being equal.
Race has been shown to be correlated with the probability that an 
individual works, therefore, we include a set of dummy variables 
(BLACK, HISPANIC, OTHRACE) to determine whether race plays a 
role in the share of leisure demanded (given that an individual is 
already working) and the share of pension plan contributions 
demanded (given that a worker participates in a salary reduction pen 
sion plan; WHITE is the base group).
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Education variables (EDUC2, EDUC3, and EDUC4) are included 
in the model as well (EDUC1 is the base group). We expect more edu 
cated workers to demand less leisure time because of the implicit 
demands of a job that are correlated with education. In addition, we 
expect more educated workers to demand a greater share of their total 
income in the form of pension plan contributions. More educated 
workers are more likely to be able to evaluate and understand the 
advantages of contributing to their pension plan than less educated 
workers. More educated workers may also be more comfortable 
directing their asset allocation decisions.
With respect to employment characteristics, variables are included 
to control for union membership, occupation, industry, and firm size. 
We expect union membership (UNION) to increase a worker's demand 
for leisure because the union may be better able to negotiate a fixed 
work schedule. Our expectations of union membership on pension 
plan contributions are less clear. While unions may be better able to 
educate their members about the advantages of contributing to a pen 
sion plan, union members are typically more likely to have an 
employer-funded defined-benefit plan. Therefore, there may be no 
need to contribute to a defined-contribution pension plan in addition to 
the defined-benefit plan.
The set of dummy variables to control for occupation include a 
variable for white collar workers (the base group), a variable to control 
for blue collar workers (BLUECOL), and a variable to control for ser 
vice collar workers (SERVCOL). 10 With respect to firm size, we 
expect workers employed in large firms to have a greater demand for 
pension plan contributions because large firms typically have better 
educational programs and materials concerning the advantages of con 
tributing to a pension plan than a small firm. Dummy variables are 
included to control for firms with 1-24 workers (FSl=the base group), 
25^9 workers (FS2), 50-99 workers (FS3), 100-249 workers (FS4), 
and 250 or more workers (FS5).
8) Demographic Variables which Affect Only Pension Plan 
Contributions:
Two additional employment related variables are only included in 
the share of pension plan contributions equation. A dummy variable is 
include to control for whether the worker was employed part time or
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full time (FULLTIME), and a dummy variable was included to control 
for whether the employer offered a match to the workers' contributions 
to the pension plan (MATCH). The direction of the effect of the 
employer match is unclear because of two potential offsetting effects. 
On one hand, we expect the presence of an employer match to have a 
positive effect on a worker's contribution to a pension plan. If an 
employer offers a dollar-for-dollar match, a worker may contribute 
more to the plan because the opportunity cost of not contributing is 
higher when the match is forgone. Alternatively, the availability of an 
employer match may result in a worker contributing less to the plan if 
the match acts as a substitute for the worker's own contributions. 11
RESULTS
Bivariate Probit Model
Table 4 contains the results from the bivariate probit model used to 
estimate selectivity corrected estimates of the model on leisure demand 
and employee benefits demand. As mentioned previously, the bivariate 
probit model is estimated with sample selection because we assume 
that only workers will receive employee benefits. The results of the 
bivariate probit model are worth briefly mentioning. Separate equa 
tions are estimated for males and females. A likelihood-ratio test for 
equality of coefficients in the male and female equations rejects the 
hypothesis that the two equations are the same.
With respect to the labor supply equation, we find that the proba 
bility of working is positively related to age until an individual reaches 
age 55, at which point the probability of working decreases as com 
pared with the aged 18-24 base group. These results are consistent for 
both males and females.
The effects of marital status on the probability of working are not 
consistent for males and females. Married males are more likely to be 
working than their unmarried counterparts. Divorced, separated, and 
never married women, however, are more likely to be working than 
married or widowed women, suggesting that unmarried women have
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fewer resources than married women, and thus have a greater incentive 
to participate in the labor force.
The effect of education is consistent for males and females: there is 
a higher probability of participating in the labor force the more educa 
tion an individual attains. Race is also generally consistent for males 
and females, with nonwhites less likely to be participating in the labor 
force than whites, with the exception of Hispanic males. In addition, 
the more children an individual has, the less likely they are to be partic 
ipating in the labor force. This is an interesting result because most 
individuals with children would be expected to need the resources that 
can be derived from working. It is not surprising, however, that the 
effect is over three times larger for females than it is for males because 
single parent families headed by women are more likely to qualify for 
public assistance.
Given that an individual is working, we find the following results 
with respect to participation in a salary reduction pension plan. For 
both males and females, age effects are strongest for younger workers, 
implying that older workers are more likely to have a defined benefit 
plan or less likely to have any type of pension plan. Marital status 
appears to play an important role in the probability of whether a 
worker participates in a salary reduction pension plan, with different 
effects for males and females. Unmarried males are less likely than 
married and widowed males to be participating in a salary reduction 
pension plan. Divorced women, on the other hand, are more likely to 
be participating in a salary reduction pension plan than all other 
women. This result suggests that divorced women may have lost their 
rights to their husbands' pension benefits and must accumulate their 
own resources for retirement.
Education has a strong linear effect on the probability that a 
worker participates in a salary reduction pension plan. Race has a 
strong negative effect, with nonwhites having a lower probability of 
participating in a salary reduction pension plan than whites. Number 
of children also has a negative effect on the probability of participating 
in a salary reduction pension plan.
With respect to characteristics associated with the labor market, we 
find statistically significant effects for union membership, hours of 
work, occupation, and firm size. Union membership is found to 
decrease the probability that a worker participates in a salary reduction
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Table 4 Bivariate Probit Model Estimates for Labor Supply Equation 



































































































































































































































NOTE: Age dummies represent the following categones: AGEl =1 if aged 18-24 (base 
group), AGE2 =1 if aged 25-34, AGE3 =1 if aged 35-44, AGE4 =1 if aged 45-54, 
and AGES =1 if aged 55-64. All other variables are defined in Table 3. Standard 
errors in parentheses.
"**significant at the 1% level. 
**significant at the 5% level. 
*significant at the 10% level.
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pension plan. Because of collective bargaining agreements, union 
members are more likely to have a defined-benefit plan funded by the 
employer. Full-time workers are more likely than part-time workers 
and white collar workers are more likely than blue collar and service 
collar workers to participate in salary reduction plans. In addition, 
workers employed in large firms are more likely to participate in salary 
reduction pension plans than workers in small firms. These results are 
generally consistent for both males and females.
Finally, the correlation coefficient between the labor supply equa 
tion and the salary reduction pension plan equation, p, is statistically 
significant for males but not for females.
AIDS Model Results
Table 5 contains the estimated coefficients from the AIDS model. 
The adjusted R2 for males and females is 0.89 and 0.90, respectively, 
for the leisure share equation, and 0.40 for both males and females for 
the salary reduction pension plan equation.
The parameters on the price and income variables are significant in 
most cases for both males and females. However, the estimated own- 
price, cross-price, and income elasticities presented in Table 6, give us 
a better understanding of the effects in the model. Therefore, we first 
discuss the results of the demographic and labor-market variables and 
then discuss the estimated elasticities.
Returning to the results in Table 5, we find consistent nonlinear 
effects of age on the share of leisure time for both males and females. 
At first, an increase in age reduces the demand for leisure time 
(increases time spent at work) and eventually increases the demand for 
leisure time. Predictions from the model indicate that males will start 
to increase their demand for leisure time at age 52.75, while females 
will increase their demand for leisure time at age 47.25. With respect 
to pension plan contributions, we find significant positive effects of age 
for males, but insignificant effects for females.
As mentioned previously, we expect marital status to have different 
effects for males and females on the share of leisure and the share of 
pension plan contributions. For males, we find that separated and 
never married males demand a greater share of leisure than married, 
widowed, and divorced males. For females, we find that all nonmar-
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ried females demand a smaller share of leisure than their married 
female counterparts. With respect to pension plan contributions, mari 
tal status has no effect for males (with the exception of a small negative 
effect for separated males). Divorced females, on the other hand, have 
a significantly lower share demand for pension plan contributions than 
all other females. This may suggest that given their budget constraints, 
divorced females choose to spend less on pension plan contributions 
than other females. While we expected unmarried women to be spend 
ing a greater share of their income on pension plan contributions, the 
effect of marital status appears to be working through the probability of 
participating in the pension plan (the bivariate probit model), as 
opposed to the amount contributed once participation has been deter 
mined.
The number of children exerts consistent positive effects on leisure 
demand for both males and females. Both males and females appear to 
demand a greater share of leisure the more children they have. With 
respect to pension plan contributions, the number of children has a 
negative effect on the share of pension plan contributions for males and 
an insignificant effect for females.
Our results for race are in large part consistent for both males and 
females in both the leisure share equation and the pension plan contri 
bution share equation. We find that nonwhites demand a greater share 
of their income in the form of leisure than whites. For males, there is 
no effect of race on pension plan contributions (any difference appears 
in the probability of participating model), while black females demand 
a greater share of pension plan contributions than females of other 
races.
With respect to education, we find consistent effects for males and 
females in the leisure share equation but not in the benefits share equa 
tion. We find that increasing levels of education result in a decreased 
demand for the share of leisure time, indicating that higher levels of 
education are associated with increasing shares of work time. Higher 
education levels result in a greater share demand of benefits for males, 
while education has no effect on the share demand of benefits for 
females.
With respect to the variables associated with the labor market, we 
find the following. Hours of work do not exert a significant effect on 
pension plan contributions for males, but do exert a negative effect for
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NOTE: Estimation results from applying an iterative unweighted version of Zellner's 
seemingly unrelated regression equations. The dependent variables are the shares of 
total full income received as leisure consumption and employee benefit share. 
Asymptotic standard error shown in parentheses. Each equation includes a set of 
two-digit industry dummy variables, and eight region variables, in addition to the 
control variables shown.
Standard errors in parentheses.
***significant at the 1% level. 
**sigmficant at the 5% level. 
*significant at the 10% level.
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NOTE: Elasticities computed from the parameter estimates displayed in Table 5. Stan 
dard error of each elasticity is in parentheses next to each elasticity. Standard errors 
are computed by taking a Taylor series approximation at the sample mean.
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females. Union status significantly increases the demand for leisure 
for both males and females. It has no effect on pension plan contribu 
tions for males but has a positive, significant effect for females. Occu 
pation also has no effect on pension plan contributions for both males 
and females. On the other hand, firm size plays an important role in 
pension plan contributions, but the results for males and females are 
mixed. We find that male workers employed in larger firms contribute 
a larger share of income to pension plans than workers in small firms, 
but the opposite is true for females. In addition, an employer match 
does not significantly affect a worker's pension plan contributions.
Finally, we find evidence of selectivity bias for males and females 
in both the leisure share equation and the pension plan contribution 
share equation. Note, however, that the signs on the selectivity correc 
tion term are inconsistent for males and females and may be due to the 
fact that the estimated correlation between the error terms in the bivari- 
ate probit model was insignificant for females.
Elasticities
The estimated coefficients shown in Table 5 are used to estimate 
uncompensated, compensated, and income elasticities. These elastici 
ties, computed at the sample mean, along with each standard error 
(shown in parentheses next to the elasticity) are shown in Table 6. The 
uncompensated own-price elasticities are all statistically significant 
and of the correct sign. Our results suggest that a 10 percent increase 
in the wage rate would reduce the share of leisure by 6.91 percent for 
males and 6.96 percent for females. We find that a 10 percent increase 
in the price of a pension plan (that is, a 10 percent decrease in the mar 
ginal tax rate) results in a 14.5 percent decrease in the share of income 
contributed to a salary reduction pension plan for males and a 15.5 per 
cent decrease for females, suggesting that pension plan contributions 
are very elastic with respect to a worker's marginal tax rate. We also 
find a nearly unitary own-price elasticity for other goods and services.
The uncompensated cross-price elasticities yield interesting 
results. We find no effect between the share of leisure time and the 
price of pension plans. However, we do find a negative effect between 
wages and pension plan contributions, suggesting that pension plan 
contributions and wages are gross substitutes. We find that a 10 per-
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cent decrease in the wage rate results in a 2.61 percent increase in pen 
sion plan contributions for males and a 3.14 percent decrease for 
females. Both males and females behave as we would expect when 
facing an employer's wage-benefit trade-off curve. The other uncom- 
pensated cross-price elasticities suggest that pension plan contributions 
and other goods and services are gross complements, while the results 
are mixed for the share of leisure and other goods and services.
The income elasticities are all positive and significant, indicating 
that all of the goods are normal goods. The results suggest that the 
share of leisure is income inelastic, while the share of pension plan 
contributions and market goods and services are income elastic.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, the simple static model of labor supply is extended 
to incorporate the demand for employee benefits. Traditionally, labor- 
supply models have ignored employee benefits, even though they have 
become a significant component of total compensation during the 20th 
century. The model presented in this paper incorporates the demand 
for employee benefits by assuming that the demand for employee ben 
efits, the demand for leisure time, and the demand for market goods 
and services are determined simultaneously. Previous studies assumed 
that labor supply decisions were exogenous to the demand for 
employee benefits. In addition, previous studies have only modeled 
the separate components of employee benefits. The model presented in 
this paper is flexible enough to include all employee benefits.
Our results, determined using data from the April 1993 Current 
Population Survey, are consistent with economic theory. We find that 
the income elasticity of worker contributions to a pension plan is 
approximately 1.5, indicating that if worker income increased by 10 
percent, contributions to a pension plan would increase by 15 percent. 
This result is consistent with previous findings. We also find that pen 
sion plan contributions are sensitive to a worker's marginal tax rate. 
This result is consistent with Woodbury and Huang (1991), who found 
that pension plan contributions would fall between 50 and 64 percent if 
their tax-preferred status was removed. We also find evidence of a
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trade-off between wages and employee benefits and the magnitude of 
the effect is consistent with adjustments for a worker's marginal tax 
rate.
While a joint model of employee benefits and labor supply is pre 
sented in this paper, data limitations allowed us to estimate the model 
only for pension plan contributions. The model presented in this paper 
is flexible enough to incorporate all employee benefits. As more data 
on the composition and cost of employee benefits becomes available at 
the micro level, future research should be able to estimate more 
detailed models.
Notes
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and should not be construed 
as representing the opinions or policies of the Employee Benefit Research Institute or 
any sponsoring agencies.
1. Those workers with single coverage may not need family coverage if there are no 
dependents.
2. Some of the evidence attributes the lower turnover rates to nonportability and 
backloading of pensions. Other studies present evidence that pension-covered 
jobs offer higher levels of total compensation; hence, the compensation premium 
accounts for the lower turnover rate.
3. Unionization and the role of collective bargaining have also been shown to affect 
an employer's decision to offer employee benefits (Freeman 1981; Belman and 
Hey wood 1991).
4. This is the maximum wage rate that the individual would earn, based on their 
human capital and other characteristics, when no employee benefits were 
received.
5. The parameter pz represents the rate of exchange between wages and employee 
benefits on the boundary of the employee's choice set Competition will tend to 
bring pz into equality both with the price at which workers would buy benefits in 
the market and with the employer's marginal cost of providing the benefits (see 
Atrostic [1982] and Triplet! [1983]).
6. Leisure refers to hours not worked that are not paid for by the employer. Paid 
vacation, sick leave, and other paid time away from work are included in 
employee benefits. For the purposes of this study, time used for home production 
is included as leisure time.
7 In the Rotterdam model, the demand function is estimated in the logarithm of dif 
ferentials instead of in levels of differentials.
8. The income term, log(m //?*), can be derived using the following steps. For a util 
ity maximizing individual, total expenditures is a function of utility and prices.
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The expenditure function can be inverted to give utility as a function of income 
and prices. We can do this for the expenditure function given in Eq. 12 and substi 
tute the result into the budget share Eq 13 to get the budget share equations as a 
function of income and prices.
9. See Michalopoulos et al. (1992) for an application of this method to child-care 
demand.
10. Service collar workers include those employed as private household service work 
ers, protective service workers, and other service workers.
11. The size of the match would be a better measure of employer contributions to the 
plan than whether a match is available. Unfortunately, data on the size of the 
employer match was missing for nearly a third of the sample.
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